Paper info: Collaboration between competitors: longitudinal interplay between collusive functions and interaction processes
Collaboration between competitors: longitudinal interplay between collusive functions and interaction processes
Place of Publication
The paper was published at the 35th IMP-conference in Paris, France in 2019.
Relationships between competitors provide significant opportunities to broaden the scope of IMP research. In this manuscript we examine longitudinal processes that enable competitors to suspend competition via illicit price-fixing relationships. In our analysis, we take a process perspective to evaluate interfirm interaction over time. We identify illicit forbearance, ability to raise prices, and ability to sustain secrecy as the core collusive functions, establishing necessary conditions for price-fixing conspiracy. We contribute to the IMP literature by theorizing the interaction between key collusive functions and underlying interactional processes investigated by the IMP Group. This allows us to establish new theoretical linkages between IMP research and the price-fixing literature.